Telepathy and the Visual in the Late Novels of Henry James by Horn, Paul Matthew Austin
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TELEPATHY AND THE VISUAL IN THE LATE NOVELS OF HENRY JAMES 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
PAUL MATTHEW AUSTIN HORN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of Master of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School of English, Drama and American and Canadian Studies 
College of Arts and Law 
The University of Birmingham 
September 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION         1 
CHAPTER ONE: LOOKING INTO      11 
CHAPTER TWO: LOOKING BACK      28 
CHAPTER THREE: LOOKING BEYOND     42 
CONCLUSION         54 
LIST OF WORKS CITED        61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis addresses the tripartite relationship between telepathy, the visual and in the 
psychologically complex late novels of Henry James, with particular focus on The Wings of 
the Dove (1902), The Ambassadors (1903), and The Golden Bowl (1904).  It acknowledges 
that significant research has been done into telepathy (Thurschwell 2001; Luckhurst 2002) 
and the visual (Crary 1990; 1999) in fin de siècle studies, but also that further insight can be 
accessed by attending to the two areas of enquiry to each other.  By juxtaposing non-literary 
materials from the fields of psychical research and visual culture, and situating them together 
within the work of James, I attempt to excavate parts of patterns of thought in the period 
compassing the end of the nineteenth century and the dawning of the twentieth.  My work is 
especially concerned with revealing the slipperiness of the borderlines between three 
dualisms: observation and imagination, subject and object, and the verbal and the visual.  A 
chapter is dedicated to each.  Reading James in this innovative way allows me to conclude by 
situating his late novels within an extended milieu of literary antecedents, particularly in 
terms of their debt to the older fictional trope of sympathy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In The Invention of Telepathy (2002), Luckhurst remarks on the surprising cultural 
connections suggested by recent critical work done around the nexus of late nineteenth 
literature and the occult.  Material, he writes, is now ‘contextualised 
within…multidisciplinary networks’ (2002: 234).  To illustrate this point, he draws on a letter 
from the novelist Henry James to his sister, Alice, in which the ‘writer of complex scenarios 
of “occult relation” or “mute communication” “practically without words” in the late novels’ 
is ‘gossiping…about the Zancigs’ (2002: 235).  Agnes and Julius Zancig were a popular stage 
act in which the wife received the telepathic impress of her husband’s thoughts (they wrote 
Two Minds but with a Single Thought (1907)); and James’s epistolary comment dismisses 
newspaper claims of fraud against them.  Luckhurst argues that this letter resituates James in 
subtle ways ‘in relation to psychical research in the 1890s and beyond, to popular cultures of 
occult doxai…and in relation to the obsession in his late fiction with “relation itself”’ (2002: 
234). 
 
Although my research takes as its object James’s late texts themselves, rather than 
contributing overtly to ‘the vast critical industry on the James family’ (Luckhurst 2002: 234), 
the connection between telepathy and the novels is a valuable one insofar as contemporary 
accounts of thought transference such as James’s can be used to historicise the author’s 
literary depictions of intersubjectivity.  However, my project’s distinctive critical contribution 
relies on the addition of a third term to the relation.  It is one which is also touched upon by 
James in the letter to Alice, but to which Luckhurst does not draw particular attention in his 
monograph: the question of the visual.  Luckhurst notes that a portion of the note is dedicated 
to discussion of Stuart Cumberland’s theory of hidden codes (2002: 234), but it is the way in 
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which James articulates this which I find illuminating.  For James, the theory of hidden codes 
is predicated on the questionable need for Agnes Zancig to wear ‘“telescopic eyeglasses” of 
great power’, James averring that ‘I confess the sense of her glasses, - watched through an 
opera glass, - did a little worry me…  Yet their communication by word is almost nil, & in 
fine, the operation of their code becomes a greater marvel than the idea of their thought 
transference’ (James 1907: 197).  The implicit interchangeableness of telepathy and telescopy 
in James’s account is striking.  It suggests a contingency between occulted seeing and 
knowing which, I contend, is also characteristic of experience with nineteenth century visual 
toys such as the stereoscope, which as Crary (1992) notes, placed the object of vision in the 
subjective as well as corporeal immediacy of the observer.  Fin de siècle encounters such as 
these suggest that telepathy and the visual test the limits of perception in similar ways: they 
are part of the same discourse, and as such, the cultural work one accomplishes may 
illuminate that of the other. 
 
My thesis explores and expands upon this hypothesis, and is in this manner 
distinctive: whilst important work has been done into telepathy (Luckhurst 2002; 
Thurschwell 2001) and visual culture (Crary 1990), nobody has brought these fields together 
and considered their full import.  By situating them together within the work of James, I use 
them to reveal the slipperiness of the borderlines between the three dualisms of observation 
and imagination, subjects and objects, and words and images; which in turn emphasises 
James’s novels’ alignment with the wider scope of modernity.  A chapter is dedicated to the 
treatment of each of these dualisms.  To this end, I draw particularly on the ‘trilogy’ of novels 
which Matthiessen dubs James’s ‘major phase’ (1944: iii), The Wings of the Dove (1902), 
The Ambassadors (1903), and The Golden Bowl (1904), so that the cultural ramifications of 
their peculiar emphases on intersubjectivity, the visual, and the limits of consciousness can be 
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explored.  My thesis concludes by situating James’s novels within an extended milieu of 
literary antecedents, particularly in terms of their use of affect. 
 
To negotiate these varied fields of enquiry, the critical value of extant 
multidisciplinary research must be acknowledged.  In terms of extant research on telepathy, 
the work of Luckhurst (2002) and Thurschwell (2001) is highly important, as they trace its 
pervasiveness in all manner of turn-of-the-century discourses.  It is of particular pertinence 
that they situate psychical research within the inchoate domain of science and scientific 
naturalism, thus illuminating the relevance of Victorian experiments in psychical phenomena 
to discussions of what constitute empiricist explorations of the limits of perception. 
 
These critical texts are also suggestive in terms of their use of source material.  
Luckhurst borrows a theoretical appellation from Bruno Latour (1999) in declaring telepathy 
the ‘black box’ (Luckhurst 2002: 70) or uncontested claim upholding much of the 
investigations carried out by the Society for Psychical Research, and thereby justifies  the use 
of its Journal and Proceedings as historical sources for his study.  My work, too, is alive to 
the research potential of these archives, and I use them to establish the provenance of 
concepts contingent with telepathy whose cultural resonance I refer to, such as Myers’ 
‘subliminal consciousness’ (1892: 298), as well as a source of nineteenth century accounts of 
occult encounters with telepathy and the visual. 
 
Thurschwell, on the other hand, asserts that psychical research also found a hospitable 
place for its investigations at the vanishing points of the nascent science of psychology.  The 
interpenetration between these psychology and telepathy partly facilitates my analysis of the 
latter’s broader historical resonance.  Freud’s and Ferenczi’s attitudes to telepathy in 
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particular are sensitive to the parallels between thought transference and psychoanalytic 
transference, as Thurschwell (2002) asserts, whilst Bergson (1896) and William James (1890) 
both posit a collective consciousness which exists outside the corporeal boundaries of the 
self.  More recent critical works such as Royle’s Telepathy and Literature (1991), and 
Derrida’s Telepathy (1988) on the other hand, coordinate psychoanalysis and telepathy by 
positing the notion that both are fundamentally textual.  In addition, in looking at the cultural 
work which ‘telepathy’ performs in the fin de siècle, it is important to demonstrate the 
historically localised resonance of the term, and to this end, my research is informed by 
criticism which establishes how intersubjective thought was delineated as sympathy in the 
preceding Romantic and Renaissance eras (Marshall 1986; Crewe 1986). 
 
To explore the negotiations telepathy has with the visual at the end of the nineteenth 
century, it is also necessary to acknowledge criticism which treats the visual in historical 
terms.  As Phillips (1993) notes, the history of vision is commonly conceived of as 
synonymous with the history of artistic representation, but whilst I recognise that important 
work has been done which uses paintings as windows onto the role of the visual in the 
nineteenth century, my research sets its parameters wider than this.  Crary’s Techniques of the 
Observer (1990) has been influential in forming this viewpoint: it posits ‘a relatively 
unfamiliar configuration of nineteenth century objects and events, that is…bodies of 
knowledge, and technological inventions that rarely appear in histories of art or of 
modernism’ (Crary 1990: 3).  Crary’s text’s scope thus emerges as interdisciplinary, 
interrelating painting with philosophy and both with new visual technology.  The effects of 
nineteenth century optical toys are particularly efficacious to Crary’s historicised conception 
of vision, and his conclusions, as well as those of Horton (1995), Warner (2006), and Krauss 
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(1982) help to inform my interpretation of the slipperiness of the boundary between the 
visible and the invisible in the period. 
 
Krauss also emphasises the reflexivity of vision – the idea that when using optical 
toys, the pleasures of seeing could easily change into the fear of being seen.  This 
configuration recapitulates the theoretical parameters of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish 
(1975), which presents surveillance and spectacle as two sides of the same coin, and is 
particularly pertinent to my discussions of subject-object relations in this thesis.  I also 
engage with extant research which negotiates the confluence between verbal and visual 
planes, with particular deference given to Martin Jay’s Downcast Eyes (1994), where the 
critic describes how language is infused with visual metaphors, the visual manifesting its 
dominance not merely in terms of perceptual experience, but also as a cultural trope.  Post-
structuralist thought (Althusser (1965), Barthes (1980), Foucault (1966)) is also useful in this 
regard due to its recognition of the arbitrariness of semiotic categories, whilst discussions of 
the more dynamic relations created between picture and text by the nineteenth century vogue 
for ekphrasis are discussed by Curtis (2002), and Wagner (1996). 
 
In bringing telepathy and the visual into relation with the late novels of Henry James, 
my research is supported by the sections of Luckhurst’s and Thurschwell’s monographs 
which draw out the ways in which James’s fiction engages with the discourse of psychical 
research from a historicist perspective, but also by works of criticism which read James’s 
texts in terms of their preoccupation with being and seeing from a more broadly philosophical 
viewpoint.  Of these, Williams’s (1993) and Armstrong’s (1983) readings of the late novels in 
relation to phenomenology are pertinent to the portion of my thesis which deals with subject-
object relations, whilst Cameron (1991) interrogates the transpersonal nature of 
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consciousness in James’s texts so persistently as to parallel the slipperiness of the self’s 
boundaries encountered by experiments with vision and thought transference in the fin de 
siècle.  My research also builds upon the methodological insights provided by work in 
Jamesian studies by Britzolakis (2001), Seltzer (1984), Posnock (1991), and Rowe (1998) 
which places James’s formal innovations in a dynamic relation to modernity. 
 
The methodology I use to bring these disparate areas of study together owes much to 
Michel Foucault’s theory of ‘discursive formations’ (1969: 34), the term which he uses in 
The Archaeology of Knowledge to describe the ‘regularities in the dispersion of statements’ 
(1969: 121) at any specific historical moment.  Discursive formations are not necessarily 
unified and do not pretend to stand in for a single, inescapable mode of constructing 
knowledge for an epoch: they may include statements which contradict each other or point in 
different directions, but at the point at which they intersect, they constitute a ‘region of 
interpositivities’ which may help illuminate some contemporaneous ‘systems of thought’ 
(Foucault 1969: 176).  My thesis takes a view of history which is similarly synchronic: it 
takes a cross section of the fin de siècle1, and examines a range of texts produced within it, 
and draws conclusions based on the ways in which they overlap.   
 
As such, my thesis is also in tune with criticism from the field of cultural studies 
which takes its cue from Foucault in viewing the non-hierarchical combination of discourses 
as ‘a kind of alchemy for producing useful knowledge’ (Johnson 1996: 75).  It is unconcerned 
with cause and effect: how and why events happen and lead on to other events.  It rejects 
overarching schema in favour of local knowledge, and extrapolates broad patterns from a 
relatively small number of disparate texts.  As Geertz has it ‘cultural analysis is intrinsically 
                                                 
1 I use the term ‘fin de siècle’ interchangeably with ‘turn-of-the-century’ in my work to denote the period 
spanning the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, when James’s last novels 
were written. 
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incomplete’ (1973: 29), and amounts to ‘guessing at meanings, assessing the guesses, and 
drawing explanatory conclusions from the better guesses, not discovering the Continent of 
Meaning and mapping out its bodiless landscape’ (1973: 20). 
 
Indeed, because my thesis reaches its conclusions in this way, it can be argued that a 
certain emphasis is placed on the space between its key discourses of telepathy, the visual, 
and the late novels of Henry James.  Anderson’s concept of the ‘intertext’ is apt:  
 
‘…the intertext is a convenient term for a relationship or a series of relationships with a 
single text or multiple texts that enrich and reorient the signification and reception of the text 
in question.  The intertext can be imagined on a continuum between deliberate imitation and 
intentional allusion, on the one hand, and on the other, an intertextuality in which the 
unlimited agency of the signifier operates virtually without regard for context, whether 
sentential and textually specific or broadly cultural, societal, and historical.’ 
(2008: 1) 
 
This space is not empty or dead, but full of unvoiced discourses, a conductor for the 
interdisciplinary communications which my thesis charts. 
 
It could be argued that this transfer of ideas between remote discourses, as a 
methodology, constitutes an uncanny echo of the dominant theme which tacitly underpins the 
tripartite relationship of my thesis: a kind of ‘distant intimacy’ which is bound up in the very 
etymology of telepathy2 and echoes through the fin de siècle discourses of the visual and the 
                                                 
2 From the Greek tele- ‘at a distance’, related to teleos ‘the completion of a cycle’ and –pathy ‘intimacy or 
touch’.  Frederic Myers first used the word ‘telepathy’ in December 1882 in the first volume of the Proceedings 
of the Society for Psychical Research. Myers wrote ‘…we venture to introduce the words Telasthesia and 
Telepathy to cover all cases of impression received at a distance’ (1882: 147). 
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‘occult relations’ of James’s late novels (1903: 311).  This idea recurs through my three 
chapters. 
 
The first chapter explores how the relational aspects of The Wings of the Dove, The 
Ambassadors, and The Golden Bowl can be elucidated through a dialectic between 
observation and imagination.  Entitled ‘Looking Into’, it draws on a range of non-literary 
materials from the fields of psychical and visual research, with particular focus on the 
cultural configurations revealed by interrelating James with crystal gazing and stereoscopy.  
Together, these cultural examples establish a common focus on the latent meaning in 
apparently empty space, which can be discerned by the workings of consciousness when it is 
‘looked into’.  This idea is properly encapsulated and magnified in my discussion by the 
Bergsonian concepts of the ‘virtual’ and ‘duration’, before being finally framed with 
contemplation of turn-of-the-century speculation about the fourth dimension as a cultural 
figure encompassing the ways in which the clearness of perception in James is stymied by the 
inseparability of observation and imagination. 
 
My second chapter engages with the embattled dualism between subject and object in 
James’s novels.  This builds upon the conclusions of my first chapter: visual evidence as the 
product of the combined operations of observation and imagination is unreliable, and the 
objective mastery of the perceiving subject over object is therefore problematised.  Titled 
‘Looking Back’, it focuses on the objects in James’s fiction which return or reflect the 
observer’s gaze.  I contend that meaning is co-opted between people and things in James, and 
that because of this they double the conclusions of contemporary experiments with thought 
transference and experiences with new visual toys in the fin de siècle, both of which attribute 
a striking amount of agency to objects.  Moreover, I argue that if meaning is therefore created 
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in the occulted space between subjects and objects, this is properly framed conceptually with 
Kristeva’s notion of the abject (1982).  My chapter concludes by depicting the way that the 
object elides subject in James’s late novels as symptomatic of wider cultural anxieties at the 
end of the nineteenth century stimulated by the object’s nascent role as commodity, and 
draws this out through reference to contemporary accounts of visits to the Exposition 
Universelle of 1900 in Paris. 
 
My third chapter incorporates the conclusions of the previous two by turning attention 
to the experience of reading James’s novels itself – a process which combines the dual 
operations of observation and imagination (as explored by chapter one), and rapport between 
subject and object (the relation investigated by chapter two).  It attends to the elision of the 
difference between the visual and the verbal in the mode of address of James’s late novels.  
Building upon post-structuralist thought and recent research which underlines the ubiquity 
and historical resonance of visual metaphors in language to establish the dynamic relations 
James’s texts create between semiotic categories, it nonetheless concludes that a good 
proportion of visual experience cannot be expressed in words, and vice versa, and that 
meaning in the novels is therefore always, to an extent, deferred.  In the light of this, it posits 
the notion that because the novels are written in this way, they emulate visual art’s ability to 
engage us in a telepathic relation where we ‘complete the incomplete’, developing meaning 
from the texts’ vacuities and unvoiced qualities.  The chapter’s title, ‘Looking Beyond’, is a 
reference to this intuitive mode of reading. 
 
My conclusion reflects on the embattled dualisms interrogated by my thesis, and then 
gestures toward further enquiries lying at its margins. It sketches a study of the textual 
memories immanent behind Henry James’s late novels’ ‘telepathic’ exchanges by 
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contemplating their relation to the older fictional trope of sympathy.  Adam Smith’s 
definition of sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) is used in conjunction with 
eighteenth century semiotic discourse on the inconclusiveness of the musical sign, and the 
Romantic poetry of Wordsworth and Coleridge to elucidate the subtleties of this concept 
from which James’s telepathic connections descend. 
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CHAPTER ONE: LOOKING INTO 
 
The evocation of an image which is a peculiar admixture of physical and abstract 
presence has a vast literary cache in the fin de siècle.  It can be traced in countless 
contemporary ghost stories.  For example, in M. R. James’s ‘Oh, Whistle and I’ll Come to 
You, My Lad’, the protagonist, Professor Parkins, finds himself terrorised by a spirit, which 
moves through space with ‘formidable quickness… groped and waved’, propels Parkins 
‘halfway through the window backwards’, although it is later concluded that there ‘seemed to 
be absolutely nothing material about it save the bedclothes, of which it had made itself a 
body’ (1904: 90).  It also has wider cultural collocates: as Flint notes, the ‘separation between 
illusion and hallucination could function as a necessary demarcation in the later nineteenth 
century, at a time when anxieties about increasing amounts of psychological disturbance and 
nervous disorders were growing in circulation’ (2000: 264).  This chapter aims to chart the 
cross-cultural tensions between imagination and observation by linking the conjured image as 
it operates in James’s fiction, produced by a combination of these two processes, with its 
collocates in contemporary discourse concerning psychical research and the limits of vision.  
To this end, I will attend in turn to the relation between images and the objects with which 
they are coincident, the suitability of the stereoscopic image as a model for perceptual 
experience and space in James’s late novels, and the movement of the image through time in 
James, before concluding by contemplating the relation of the image in James to the wider 
scope of modernity in terms of its engagement with the contemporaneous formulation of 
theories of higher dimensions. 
 
To negotiate these interdisciplinary leaps, I make frequent recourse to the 
contemporary philosophical texts of Henri Bergson.  Through their meditations on perception 
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they not only participate in the vast cultural figurations which I am attempting to uncover, but 
via the strikingly imagistic mien of certain passages, help me to articulate some of the more 
complex concepts involved in my argument. One such passage is in Matter and Memory: 
 
‘When a ray of light passes from one medium to another, it usually traverses it with a change 
of direction.  But the respective densities of the two media may be such that, for a given angle 
of incidence, refraction is no longer possible.  Then we have total reflexion.  The luminous 
point gives rise to a virtual image which symbolises, so to speak, the fact that the luminous 
rays cannot pursue their way.  Perception is just a phenomenon of the same kind…it is like an 
effect of mirage.’ 
(Bergson 1896: 29) 
 
Bergson’s mirage simile here hints at the role which imagination plays in perception; 
and this, together with the invocation of a luminous ‘virtual image’ coincident with the object 
being observed facilitates a lateral link with a late nineteenth-century narratives concerning 
crystal-gazing.  Kate Flint uses crystal gazing as a means of measuring Victorian attitudes 
towards ‘hallucination and illusion’ (2000: 258), and draws on the testimony of Andrew 
Lang, a Scottish man of letters, poet, novelist, and literary critic who was also president of the 
Society for Psychical Research in 1911, who notes that ‘people who, when they think, see a 
mental picture on the subject of their thoughts, people who are good “visualisers”, are likely 
to succeed best with the crystal’ (Lang 1894: 222, cited in Flint 2000).  In a complementary 
passage found in a letter from Lang to the Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, he 
recapitulates the statement of a Miss Angus, who describes her experience of crystal-gazing thus:  
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‘It is difficult to state exactly how pictures appear to me, when I look in a crystal. After 
focussing my eye for some time on a particular spot of light in the ball, my mind becomes 
aware that it may expect to see a vision; but, as far as I can judge, the moment the vision 
comes, the ball seems to disappear, so it is difficult for me to say if my pictures are actually 
seen in the crystal, or only projected outside in the space between the eye and the ball.’ 
(Lang 1898: 223) 
 
Echoing Bergson’s vocabulary, these testimonies underline the relatedness of the operations 
of mind’s eye and eye’s mind in producing images which come into existence in the vicinity 
of a physical object in space.   
 
These images exist on the borderline between physical and abstract presence, and thus 
echo the metaphysics of James’s late novels, where protagonists experience the object-world 
as showing them ‘…in some mirrored form [their] impressions and conclusions’ (James 
1903: 149).  This tendency is particularly pronounced in the character’s meditations on the 
titular object of The Golden Bowl; and can be observed when James’s text is brought into 
dynamic relation with the H. G. Wells story, ‘The Crystal Egg’ (1897)3.  The magic crystal of 
the latter narrative has exceptional properties: after a thin shaft of daylight has been shone 
upon it, the egg glows luminously, and ‘being peered into at an angle of about 137 degrees 
from the direction of the illuminating ray gave a clear and consistent picture of a wide and 
peculiar country-side.  It was not dream-like at all; it produced a definite impression’ (Wells 
1897: 293).  Whilst the story ends with the final and decisive comment that ‘No theory of 
hallucination suffices for the facts’ (Wells 1897: 300), this conclusion is only credible so far 
as it can be accommodated to the persistent counterargument that the world seen through the 
                                                 
3 Flint also draws attention to this story in relation to hallucination and vision (2000: 276-7). 
14 
 
glass is influenced by the emotional state of the gazer.  This interpretation allows us to 
contemplate the similarity of this impulse to the metaphysical meditation prompted by the 
‘gilded crystal bowl from the little Bloomsbury shop’ (James 1904: 292) in James’s novel.  
The object becomes a repository for the central characters’ reverie in The Golden Bowl, and 
on such occasions the borderline between imagination and observation becomes unclear.  The 
shiftiness of this division is particularly pronounced when on staring at her reflection in its 
surface Maggie visualises an alternative present of unrealised perfection: ‘the golden bowl — 
as it was to have been . . . The bowl with all our happiness in it. The bowl without the crack’ 
(James 1904: 475). 
 
Because this example from The Golden Bowl posits the co-presence of object and 
image to a perceiving subject, it can be averred that perceptual experience in this instance 
submits to the logic of the ‘virtual’, as it is delineated by Bergson (a concept which I will 
return to when I come to discuss the way in which the image moves through time).  In Matter 
and Memory, Bergson explains it as follows:  
 
‘. . . if we suppose an extended continuum, and, in this continuum [Bergson’s emphasis], the 
centre of real action which is represented by our body, its activity will appear to illuminate all 
those parts of matter with which at each successive moment it can deal. The same needs, the 
same power of action, which have delimited our body in matter will also carve out distinct 
bodies in the surrounding medium. Everything will happen as if we allowed to filter through 
us that action of external things which is real, in order to arrest and retain that which is 
virtual: this virtual action of things upon our body and of our body upon things is our 
perception itself.’  
(Bergson 1896: 232) 
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For Bergson the part is virtual and the whole is real.  Consciousness extracts virtual 
images from the whole, which ‘are not pictured in consciousness without some 
foreshadowing in the form of a sketch or a tendency, of the movements by which these 
images would be acted or played in space…and set free all that they implicitly contain of 
spatial movement’ (Bergson 1896: 339).  The golden bowl therefore exists in itself, but on 
the other hand is in itself, pictorial, as Maggie perceives it with her own subjectivity.  The 
image she perceives is immaterial, yet appears to occupy a position in space: in Bergsonian 
terms, this is ‘the meeting point of mind and matter’ (1896: 325), and, by implication, 
imagination and observation. 
 
This phenomenon can be observed elsewhere in James, as I shall explore later.  
Moreover, complimentary emphases are given in The Ambassadors, where it is frequently 
suggested that thoughts about objects can be externalised and perceived visually by others.  
We are told ‘a thousand unuttered thoughts hummed for him [Lambert Strether] in the air’ 
(James 1903: 389), and that these may be perceived by Sarah’s ‘conscious eyes’ (James 
1903: 389).  Later, Strether notes that for Miss Gostrey and himself, ‘things unuttered were in 
the air’ (James 1903: 508); and the emphasis here on ‘things’ not ‘words’ crucially 
establishes the imagistic quality of consciousness.  If objects are consistently encountered in 
this way in James’s later fiction, it follows that the material world will be experienced, in 
Bergson’s words, as an ‘aggregate of images’ (Bergson 1896: 3).  However, I would argue 
that this model of perceptual experience also has something in common with what Jonathan 
Crary refers to as ‘the most significant form of visual imagery in the nineteenth century, with 
the exception of photographs’ (Crary 1990: 116): the stereoscope.  Providing the eyes of the 
viewer with two different images, representing two perspectives of the same object, with a 
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minor deviation similar to the perspectives that both eyes naturally receive in binocular 
vision, this instrument ‘presuppose[d] perceptual experience to be essentially an 
apprehension of differences’ (Crary 1990: 120), and because it treats vision in this way on 
this basis I would argue for the inclusion of those aspects of James’s and Bergson’s texts 
discussed above into the distinct stratum in the history of ideas which, for Crary, the 
stereoscopic view heralds.  This provides a framework for the complex phenomenology of 
James’s later texts where the relationship between the perceiving subject and the object is 
constantly shifting depending on negotiations between self and the incrementally changing, 
multifarious object-world.  Thus, Strether on finding that in her ‘museum of artefacts’ Maria 
Gostrey has ‘made their encounter a relation’, also elucidates that ‘the relation profited by a 
mass of things that were not strictly in it or of it; by the air in which they sat, by the high cold 
delicate room outside and the little plash in the court, by the First Empire and the relics in the 
stiff cabinets, by matters as far off as those and by others as near as the unbroken clasp of her 
hands in her lap and the look her expression had of being most natural when her eyes were 
most fixed’ (James 1903: 239).  His perceptual experience is involuntarily shaped by the 
protean configurations of images and objects in a manner which echoes the conclusions of the 
latest experiments with visual technology.   
 
A further function of the stereoscopic view in James’s late novels is that it disrupts 
classical ideas of space: if perspective as outlined by Newton (1687) is absolute - in the sense 
that it existed permanently and independently of whether there were any matter in the space, 
in James’s novels it is a causeway through which the ‘crammed consciousness’ (James 1903: 
158) of a community flows. As Crary notes, the fundamental organisation of the stereoscopic 
image is such that ‘compared to the strange insubstantiality of objects and figures located in 
the middle ground, the absolutely airless space surrounding them has a disturbing palpability’ 
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(1990: 125).  The space between things is thus brought into being; it is transpersonal, empty, 
yet full of latent meaning for those able to discern it.  Because it has these qualities, I believe 
it can be interpreted as contingent with turn-of-the-century psychical and psychological 
writing which conceived of consciousness in spatial terms.  William James’s concept of 
‘stream of thought’ asserted that ‘every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the 
free water of consciousness that flows round it’ (1884: 16); and Frederic Myers developed 
this theory to arrive at his idea of the ‘subliminal consciousness’ (1892: 298).   ‘The 
Subliminal Consciousness’ which, as Luckhurst (2002) details was first published in the 
Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research between 1891 and 1895 before being 
revised posthumously for the book Human Personality and the Survival of Bodily Death 
(1903), also transcends the limits of a life in one place, asserting that each of us ‘is in reality 
an abiding psychical entity far more extensive than he knows, – an individuality which can 
never express itself completely through any corporeal manifestation.  The self manifests itself 
through the organism, but there is always some part of the self unmanifested, and always as it 
seems some power of organic expression in abeyance or reserve’ (Myers 1903: 278).   
 
Moreover, I would contend that Henry James’s late novels are particularly in tune 
with such speculations about space and consciousness when their protagonists subtract from 
pregnant voids in search of meaning.  ‘Abyss’, as Brooks (1976) notes, is a word that recurs 
with insistent frequency in James’s writing and holds a particularly significant place in The 
Wings of the Dove.  Our first direct perception of Milly Theale shows her seated on a slab of 
rock overhanging ‘gulfs of air’ (James 1902: 88); and Susan Stringham’s reaction grasps at 
the possibility of ‘some betrayed accordance of Milly’s caprice with a…hidden obsession’ 
(James 1902: 89): the possibility of a plunge into the gulf, or making her choice of the 
kingdoms of the earth.  Brooks asserts that this image ramifies metaphorically throughout the 
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novel, as ‘plumbing the abysses… comes to mean almost literally positing the mass and 
contours of the unseen from the gestures of the observed’ (1976: 184).  Brooks asserts that its 
latent presence is principally aligned in the novel with the taboo subjects of Milly’s illness 
and the illicit relation between Kate and Densher; and that after these topics are semantically 
crystallised in the critical interview between Milly and Lord Mark in Venice, the abyss yields 
up this revelation to Densher.  As he circles restlessly in the storm-lashed Piazza San Marco, 
‘the drawing-room of Europe, profaned and bewildered by some reverse of fortune’ (James 
1902: 404), he is brought to a halt ‘with the force of his sharpest impression’, having caught 
sight of Lord Mark, seated in Florian’s.  The instantaneous recognition of his identity at once 
has ‘all the effect of establishing connexions – connexions startling and direct’ (James 1902: 
405): ‘The vice in the air, otherwise, was too much like the breath of fate.  The weather had 
changed, the rain was ugly, the wind wicked, the sea impossible, because of Lord Mark’ 
(James 1902: 406).  Without a word of recognition being exchanged between the two, things 
are ‘as plain to Densher as if he had had them in words’ (James 1902: 406).  Perceptual 
experience in this instance demonstrates the imbrication of observation and imagination 
insofar as sensory impressions are combined with a subtraction from an ethereal 
intersubjective reserve to penetrate behind and beneath the surface of people and things. 
 
However, whilst such images may overlap in space, the idea that images may co-exist 
in different locations in time – which was one of considerable currency during the fin de 
siècle – can also be traced, if obliquely, in James’s novels.  As Warner has noted, ‘Telepathy 
was “thought at a distance”… but before Einstein’s theory of relativity, it was also often 
conceived in temporal terms, and inspired excited dreams of communications from one time 
to another between spirits and other, occult forces’ (2006: 265-6).  In Warner’s view, Freud’s 
model of consciousness and Jung’s theory of the collective unconscious can be viewed as part 
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of a general wave of speculation at the turn of the century, which also included Myer’s theory 
of the subliminal self, and was characterised by a homologous attention to the phrenic 
movement between memory and perception.  In the world of literature, in H. G. Wells’s The 
Time Machine (1895), the eponymous invention ‘translates a faculty of mind – projective 
imagination – into an actual piece of technology, and embodies it physically in time and 
space’, as Warner (2005: xiv) also notes in an introductory essay to a recent edition of the 
text.  I contend that despite their apparently dissimilar literary mien, James’s novels are in 
contact, like Wells’s, though not overtly, with this contemporary discourse concerning a 
fixation with time travel, through the way in which their protagonists experience perception 
as bound up with lateral movements backward and forward in time.   
 
Furthermore, I believe that this can be elucidated by investigating the ways in which 
perceptual experience in James engages with Bergson’s concept of the virtual.  Bergson 
asserts that the virtual image ‘thus shaped [by subtraction from the whole] implies the 
perception, no longer successive, but simultaneous, of a before and after, and that it would be 
a contradiction to suppose a succession that was only a succession, and which nevertheless 
was contained in one and the same instant’ (1889: 101).  This temporal movement toward 
actualisation implies a virtual multiplicity of images, none of which are identical.  In the 
context of James, this movement is best understood in conversation with Bergson’s theory of 
time and consciousness, duration (1889; 1896; 1907; 1920).  The latter concept is a kind of 
lived time.  It is mobile, and belongs to objects as much as to subjects.  It is qualitative, 
multiple, indivisible, and constantly interpenetrating itself, so that a person’s duration is 
disclosed by other durations, which are implicated in and that unfold it.  In combination with 
the virtual, it renders perception the experience of a selection of infinite potential actions 
which simultaneously belong and do not belong to the perceiving subject.  Bergson explains 
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this by giving the example of a simultaneity of fluxes in which while ‘seated on the bank of a 
river, the flowing of the water, the gliding of a boat or the flight of a bird, the ceaseless 
murmur of our life’s deeps, are for us three separate things or only one, as we choose’ 
(Bergson 1920: 210).  As Ansell-Pearson elucidates, ‘here there is an apportioning without 
dividing, a being of the one and the many at the same time…The observer’s duration both 
encompasses and discloses other durations and the virtual multiplicity of actions with which 
they reverberate’ (2002: 10).  I would argue that an analogous dynamic can be seen at work 
in James’s late texts, destabilising the opposition between imagination and observation, 
asserting that time is no longer something thought, but something lived. 
 
It is particularly pronounced in the opening of The Wings of the Dove, where, waiting 
for her father, Kate paces in and out of her room.  ‘Each time she turned in again, each time, 
in her impatience, she gave him up, it was to sound to a deeper depth, while she tasted the 
faint, flat emanation of things’ (James 1902: 5).  As Schweizer (2005) notes, in her 
impatience she awakens to an uncanny quality of waiting, namely her endurance of the 
indifferent continuity of her inner life, and the inner life of ‘things’ – indifferent to the 
exigencies of official time.  She looks ‘at the sallow prints on the walls, and the lonely 
magazine, a year old, that combined, with a small lamp in coloured glass and a knitted white 
centre-piece wanting in freshness, to enhance the effect of the purplish cloth on the principal 
table' (James 1902: 5).  Each thing is pulled loose from its delitescence to have its 
idiosyncrasies exposed, its virtual actions drawn out.  Just as Kate waits for the end of her 
enforced imprisonment in such existential consciousness, so ‘each object seems likewise 
waiting to be released from her gaze to resume its invisibility in the universal flux of what 
Bergson mystically calls “the Whole”’, so that Kate is seen to be ‘dwelling too long on a 
note; instead of a melodic duration she hears a succession of notes’ (Schweizer 2005: 788). 
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Consciousness in this way becomes the space where time unfurls variegated yet mutually 
inclusive durations in simultaneity.  Ostensibly mismatched timeframes disclose themselves, 
in palimpsest style, on top of each other. 
 
Moreover, as Bergson asserts, ‘between brute matter and the mind most capable of 
reflexion, there are all possible intensities of memory, or what comes to the same thing, all 
the degrees of freedom’ (1896: 296).  The virtual and actual always coexist in perception, but 
whilst in the languor of Kate’s ennui, the overlapping durations of objects evidence the 
subtractive mechanics of this figuration, elsewhere in James’s late fiction, protagonists 
experience the world as a perceptual shock, as it is expressed in Plateau’s concept of the 
persistence of vision: ‘If several objects which differ sequentially in terms of form and 
position are presented one after the other to the eye in very brief intervals and sufficiently 
close together, the impressions they produce on the retina will blend together without 
confusion and one will believe that a single object is gradually changing form and position’ 
(Crary 1990: 109).  Crary asserts that such an experience of visual intensity carries a 
historically localised meaning at the end of the nineteenth century in that is consistent with 
the cultural impact and perceptual shock of railroad travel (and perceptual experience more 
generally) as it is delineated by Friedrich Nietzsche in Human, All Too Human.  Nietzsche 
asserts ‘With the tremendous acceleration of life, mind and eye have become accustomed to 
seeing and judging partially or inaccurately, and everyone is like the traveller who gets to 
know a land and its people from a railway carriage’ (1878: 102).  I would argue that this 
formulation of visual experience permeates The Golden Bowl: for Maggie it serves as a 
metaphor for existential flux, whereby her life is disrupted by the ‘lurches of the mystic train’ 
and the ‘vision…suddenly swarmed’ which results from the sudden movement of a ‘mystic 
train in which…she was travelling’ (James 1904: 390), whilst for Fanny Assingham, the 
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realisation of her imbrication with the tangle of romantic relationships at the novel’s core is 
analogous with a sudden flash of ‘blue daylight towards which, through a darksome tunnel, 
she had been pushing away, and the elation in her voice, combined with her recovered 
alertness, might have signalled the sharp whistle of the train that shoots at last into the open’ 
(James 1904: 93). 
 
 However, the above optical illusion, like any other, depends on point of view.  It is 
therefore pertinent to recall that as Helmholtz contended, the eye owns vision, but in two 
ways, focal and peripheral vision:  
 
‘To look at anything means to place the eye in such a position that the image of the object 
falls on the small region of perfectly clear vision… Whatever we want to see we look at, and 
see it accurately; what we do not look at, we do not as a rule care for at the moment, and so 
do not notice how imperfectly we see it. ‘ 
(Helmholtz 1866: 138).   
 
Isobel Armstrong (2008) draws on the example of a Zoetrope (discrete images on the inside 
of a rotating drum viewed from the outside through slits cut in the drum) in the Bill Douglas 
Centre to explore the limits of Helmholtz’s distinction.  It is worth recapitulating the 
observations about its operation in the context of my argument.  Concentrating on a single slit 
area as the drum rotates ‘produces a sequence of climbing and vaulting actions in succession, 
as minute blue and red figures repeatedly bend, rise, and jump’ (Armstrong 2008: 350), but 
the effectiveness of this illusion depends on visual choices.  Factors such as the regularity of 
the rotation and tilt of the drum (controlled by the viewer) affect vision by degrees; and there 
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is an alternative way of viewing, through a succession of slits, where segmented parts of the 
otherwise fluid vaulting process appear.   
 
The multifarious range of partial, distinct perspectives which the different ways of 
interacting with this device suggest evokes the choice which the virtual necessitates in 
subtracting from the actual, or whole: whilst the image relates to the object, it does not 
represent it in the wholeness of being.  The temporal aspect of the toy, moreover, shows 
perception’s submission to duration in Bergsonian terms: since time is mobile, as soon as one 
attempts to measure a moment qualitatively, it is gone.  Perception, thus figured, measures 
the possible action of a body upon things, and vice versa.  As Ansell-Pearson notes, for 
Bergson, ‘memory operates in terms of a similar virtuality [to observation], beginning with a 
virtual state and leading step by step up to the point where it gets materialized in an actual 
perception’ (2005: 1117).  In ‘Memory of the Present and False Recognition’ Bergson asserts 
that recollection is created alongside an actual perception: ‘Either the present leaves no trace 
in memory, or it is twofold at every moment, its very up-rush being in two jets exactly 
symmetrical, one of which falls back towards the past whilst the other springs forward 
towards the future’ (Bergson 1908: 55).  Bergson conceives of ‘pure memory’ as engaging 
with the past either via ‘image-remembrance’ (1896; 1908), whereby recollections rise up 
spontaneously into consciousness to meet the present moment. 
 
The function of this latter, fluid interrelation is most perceptible in Densher’s final 
interview with Maud at Lancaster Gate in The Wings of the Dove.  Having previously been 
unable to perceive of Milly beyond the transcendent images of ‘dove, angel, saviour, or 
priceless pearl’ (King 2000: 1), merely by ‘speaking of his supreme personal impression’ of 
Milly, Densher ‘pictures the case’ for Maud (James 1992: 459). By the ‘queer turn’ (James 
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1992: 459) of bringing his etherealised memory of Milly into scenic relation with the shades 
of squalor of her decline, he spatialises perception, and makes time simultaneous, thus 
building bridges between past, present, and future. As Freud asserts in ‘Remembering, 
Repeating, and Working Through’, ‘as long as the patient is in the treatment he cannot escape 
from this compulsion to repeat; and in the end we understand that this is his way of 
remembering’ (1914: 394-5), but in this interview, which has the atmosphere of a 
psychoanalytic therapy session, Densher moves beyond this stage, and the spontaneous 
promptings of memory find him ‘uttering to the elder woman what had been impossible’ 
(James 1992: 460). 
 
Moreover, as I established earlier in this chapter, the unconscious in James’s texts is 
transpersonal; and it can be asserted that the spontaneous promptings of Densher’s pictorial 
memories constitute the progeny of a deep telepathic connection across time.  As Cameron 
asserts, ‘to think of death in Sir Luke Strett’s chambers, as Milly does, is to make of death a 
picture, looked at by others, into which the self will be transmuted’ (1989: 142); and it can be 
contended that this image is materialised in Densher’s ‘picture’ of Milly as it forms in the 
process of his interview with Maud, so that his contemplation that ‘the thought was all his 
own’ (James 1992: 460), may be perceived ironically.  Just as Ralph meditates on the portrait 
of himself, in The Sense of the Past, ‘it was when life was framed in death that the picture 
was really hung up’ (James 1917: 48) – these images allow James’s protagonists communion 
with the Other across the void of time.  They also allow the co-ordination of Bergson’s 
concept of the virtual with contemporary discourse on the potential for human personality to 
survive bodily death.  Indeed, James’s own essay, ‘Is There Life After Death?’ affirms the 
power of artistic consciousness to live on, to survive outside itself via the representations it 
leaves behind, given its ‘enormous multiplication of our possible relations… carrying the 
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field of perception further and further, making it lose itself in the ineffable’.  ‘How can we 
after it’, James asks, ‘hold complete disconnection likely?’ (1910: 607, cited in Luckhurst 
2002)  This contention seems to be mirrored in The Wings of the Dove: Milly, dead, only 
seems more alive.  She is, as Cameron notes, ‘so rich with life as to loosen Densher’s hold 
over the woman he loved and the riches he desired so that he can embrace instead a 
remembered image of the dead girl’ (1989: 151).  This distant intimacy is so strong that Kate 
accuses him of ‘fallen in love with [Milly]’ (James 1992: 451), love being in Myers’ words ‘a 
kind of exalted, but unspecialised telepathy’ (1903: 281) 
 
We are returned, then, to the idea with which this chapter began: the contemplation of 
an image, between a physical and abstract presence, not definitely wholly observed, or 
wholly imagined.  I have shown this concept to be a vast receptacle for the complex 
phenomenology of James’s late novels: it is the meeting point of mind and matter, and 
infinitely multiple across space and time; existing as something between a physical and 
abstract presence, and ultimately it troubles the opposition of observation and imagination.  
Moreover, its ubiquity is such that the higher faculties of Jamesian subjectivity are depicted 
pictorially: in Maggie’s vision of an alternative present of unrealised perfection in the 
reflections of The Golden Bowl’s titular object, Strether’s spatial elucidation of 
consciousness, and the telepathic transfer of images across time between Densher and Milly.  
It is on the basis of such pictorial emphases that I believe the existential phenomenology of 
James’s texts can be seen to engage with a wider grappling with the limits of perception in fin 
de siècle culture. 
 
Specifically, it can be contended that Henry James’s texts are in contact with late 
nineteenth century theories about the possibility of existence in four (or more) dimensions.  
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The concept of four dimensional space differed from three-dimensional space, as enshrined 
by Euclid’s Elements, in that it posited an additional dimension, indistinguishable from the 
other three.  As Jann (2006) details, it was first established in the early nineteenth century by 
European mathematicians such as Nickolai Lobachevsky and Janos Bolyai, and later 
popularised by the German mathematician Hermann von Helmholtz.  The concept’s wide 
cultural impact extended to literature, being ‘exploited as a plot device by authors such as H. 
G. Wells in ‘The Remarkable Case of Davidson’s Eyes’ (1895), ‘The Wonderful Visit’ 
(1895), and ‘The Plattner Story’ (1896), and that higher dimensions also figure in Oscar 
Wilde’s ‘The Canterville Ghost’ (1891) and Joseph Conrad and Ford Maddox Brown’s The 
Inheritors (1901)’ (Jann 2006: xxix).  I would assert that despite their apparently dissimilar 
literary mien, James’s novels are in contact, albeit at a slightly occulted distance, with this 
contemporary popular fixation; and this is most clearly evidenced by evoking the example of 
Abbot’s Flatland (1884), where the possibility of fourth dimensional and higher geometries 
are voiced by analogy with the perceptual shock visited on its protagonist, A Square, who is 
supplanted from his linear world to the three-dimensional ‘Spaceland’.  It is the way in which 
this prospect is articulated which is crucial: his thirst for knowledge stimulated by the 
teachings of the emissary Sphere, A Square vows to ‘arouse in the interiors of Plane and 
Solid Humanity a spirit of rebellion against the Conceit which would limit our Dimensions to 
Two or Three or any number short of Infinity [emphasis mine]’ (Abbott 1884: 102).  The 
stress on perception’s subtraction from an infinitude of theoretical space allows a resonance 
with Bergson’s delineation of the virtual and the abstraction from the actual with which it is 
established.  It is this latter theory which has been so productive for establishing a theory of 
the occulted phenomenology of James’s late texts, and it hereby extends its contextual 
valency by showing Jamesian phenomenology to be connected with the same wave of 
speculation which as the innovations in nineteenth-century geometrics which ‘occupied such 
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a central position in Victorian debates about the accessibility of absolute truth’ (Jann 2006: 
xxiv). 
 
James’s characters thus explore a material world which throngs with virtual action, 
memories, and images.  It can be averred that the idea of a virtual realm is tackled head on in 
The Spoils of Poynton, where Fleda notices, walking with Mrs Gereth in the rooms of Ricks, 
something subtle and wonderful: ‘a presence, a perfume, a touch…a soul, a story, a life’.  
‘There’s ever so much more here than you and I’.  ‘We’re in fact just three!’  ‘Does it 
happen,’ her companion asks, ‘to be in your power to give it a name?’ ‘It’s a kind of fourth 
dimension’ (James 1896: 203).  Flint uses the fourth dimension in a general sense to establish 
‘the binary between the visible and the invisible’ (2000: 283), and in fact, I believe it may 
stand as an effective metaphor for the number of ways in which the clarity of perception in 
James is occluded by the inseparability of observation and imagination that this chapter has 
explored:  the coincidence of image and object in space, the stereoscopic view and the spatial 
conception of consciousness which it supports, and the movement of the image through time.  
Just as Abbot notes in The Kernel and the Husk4 that we cannot ‘conceive of space of Four 
Dimensions… although we can perhaps describe what some of its phenomena would be if it 
existed’ (1886: 259), meshing together the operations of the eye’s mind and mind’s eye, so 
do the aspects of perception which this chapter examines necessarily involve the intertwining 
of imagination and observation.  The mutual inclusiveness between these two terms prepares 
the ground for my next chapter: their imbrication renders the nature of perceptual evidence 
protean and multiple, and the objective mastery of the perceiving subject over the passive 
object is disturbed.  It is the embattled dualism between subject and object in James’s late 
novels which is explored in the chapter which follows. 
                                                 
4 A theological work written by Abbott around the time of Flatland which explored the history of human 
imagination bycoordinating religious belief with scientific concepts. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LOOKING BACK 
 
As explored in my previous chapter, James’s late texts exhibit a preoccupation with 
the mechanics of seeing.  However, the later novels in particular also show a preoccupation 
with the limitations as well as the possibilities of vision.  Hazel Hutchison notes that ‘in his 
middle years, James’s own eyesight began to alter and deteriorate, lending an urgency to the 
treatment of vision within his fiction’ (2005: 40); and links this causally to aspects of the 
innovative narratives of the 1890s – ‘What Maisie Knew with its carefully controlled use of 
focalisation, The Awkward Age with its successive “aspects”, The Turn of the Screw and The 
Sacred Fount with their frustratingly first-person narratives’ (2005: 41) – all of which 
Hutchison asserts can be read as technical experiments in limited point of view.  However, I 
would argue that James’s late novels can also be seen as engaging with the wider scope of 
modernity - in particular the developments in visual culture at the end of the nineteenth 
century in optics, painting and philosophy, which constructed an observer whose body was 
important precisely for the way it could be examined, quantified, fooled, and controlled by 
objects.  In this chapter I will build on Hutchison’s analysis to move beyond the narrow 
context of the personal and biographical to the wider scope of modernity in terms of James’s 
texts’ engagement with changes in visual culture – with particular emphasis on the shiftiness 
of the boundary between the fin de siècle observer and the object world. 
 
My argument draws on Crary’s model of the history of visuality as espoused in 
Techniques of the Observer (1990).  He asserts that in the nineteenth century a long-enduring 
account of vision, which took the operations of the camera obscura as its model, was 
displaced by that suggested by other optical devices such as the kaleidoscope, the diorama, 
and most significantly, the stereoscope.  Whereas the camera obscura positioned vision on a 
29 
 
plane severed from the human observer, and associated with a unifying order or logic, these 
new technologies represented vision as relocated within the corporeal immediacy of the 
subject.  Crary’s analysis seeks to uncover ‘the conditions and forces that defined or allowed 
the formation of a dominant model of what an observer was in the nineteenth century’ (1990: 
7), and via a methodology which is Foucauldian.  Crary appropriates the conclusions of 
Discipline and Punish (1975) by asserting that the body of the modern viewer, no less than 
that of the labourer or prisoner, becomes an object of standardisation, regulation, and control, 
and attempts to prove this hypothesis by negotiating individualised ‘series’ (that is, the name 
Foucault (1969) gives to historical phenomena in specific areas of intellectual history), which 
are juxtaposed to one another, track, overlie, and interconnect.  In this way, the 
‘fundamentally disunified and aggregate field of disjunct elements’ (Crary 1990: 125) 
produced by visual toys can be linked to the personal exploration of nonclassical space by 
proto-modernist painters, and contemporary philosophers. 
 
I argue that this kind of negotiation can also be traced in James’s later texts.  Indeed, 
it can be traced in The Ambassadors, which is, for Hutchison, the novel that provides the 
foundation for her thesis, as it ‘deals most explicitly with problems of vision and perspective 
and makes use of lenses, mirrors, frames, and spectacles in its attempt to focus the blurred 
impressions of Strether's experience’ (Hutchison 2005: 40).  In her analysis of Strether’s 
engagement with the Lambinet landscape, Hutchison interprets it as an ‘aid to sight’ (2005: 
46) homologous to the protagonist’s spectacles which allows for a connection between 
opposites: ‘New England and Europe, art and reality, imagination and action, past and 
present’ (2005: 45).  But the picture also fragments and dislocates Strether’s view of reality, 
confronting the Woollett editor with an image equable with disunified visual experience 
associated with the visual toys Crary (1992) deals with in his analysis.  Whilst there is room 
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in Hutchison’s analysis for the view that such a distorted vision can offer keen insight – she 
notes that Strether’s musing on the Lambinet painting demonstrates awareness at quite a 
sophisticated level that his perceptions are artificial constructs, and links this to Rivkin’s 
assertion that a ‘logic of delegation’ ensures that nothing in the novel fulfils its original 
purpose, ‘that the ambassador's fate is inevitably a straying from authority’ (Hutchison 2005: 
48) – this perspective is only posited insofar as it can support her overarching thesis, that 
James’s interest in the visual was intensified by the deterioration in his own eyesight.  
Hutchison asserts that ‘the knowledge that the world is more rich and strange than he had 
thought becomes for Strether the most precious thing he carries home from Paris’ (2005: 48), 
and I am broadly in agreement, but would suggest that the Lambinet portrait is for James’s 
protagonist more than a ‘lens’ (Hutchison 2005: 46) – that because it is an object which 
fragments and distorts, challenging the subjects clarity and consistency of perceptual 
judgment, its effect is more resonant with that of the stereoscope and other more complex 
visual technologies which Crary (1990) describes. 
 
Moreover, the creation of meaning between subject and object here is curiously co-
optive and in this way echoes Horton’s delineation of the experience of spectators at diorama 
displays in the nineteenth century as feeling as if they were both watching a performance, and 
being part of it (1995).  A further collocate can be found in the model of art and spectatorship 
promoted by contemporary art criticism, not least James’s own, which as Bartel notes was 
‘characterized by the sort of subdued engagement…associated with dialogue between friends 
or polite strangers’ (2005: 175).  For example, in one review, he writes that the painting of 
Burne-Jones is ‘almost alone in having the gravity and deliberation of truly valuable speech’ 
(James 1882: 205, cited in Bartel 2005).  This transcendental relation, Butte argues, thus 
approaches the Benjaminian ideal of an art in which the rendering of realities could divulge 
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‘something like an optical unconscious, a repository of unmanaged details that could 
“manage to assure us of an immense and unexpected field of action”’ (Bartel 2005: 174). 
 
The relations between art objects in James’s novels and the subjects which perceive 
them can therefore be said to interlace with concomitant developments in visual culture. Such 
a conclusion brings to mind James’s insistence, in the preface to Roderick Hudson, that 
‘really, universally, relations stop nowhere’ (1875: 37).  It can be argued that this trope is 
particularly pronounced in James’s later fiction.  In The Portrait of a Lady, Isabel Archer can 
assert a relationship of mastery and service between subject and object by claiming that 
‘…nothing else expresses me.  Nothing that belongs to me is any measure of me; 
everything’s on the contrary a limit, a barrier, and a perfectly arbitrary one’ (James 1881: 
253).  Coulson (2004) asserts that by controlling and abjuring the world of objects Isabel 
shores up her sense of her own integrity, her subjectivity, but that in the later texts of James, 
and particularly The Wings of the Dove, the structure of subjects and objects persists only by 
‘suppressing its unconscious, the messy underside that constantly threatens this orderly 
opposition’ (Coulson 2004: 120).  This interpretation is contiguous with my own: it is 
especially in tune with my discussion of the virtual in James, and the fecund transpersonal 
space which renders James’s protagonists subject to the presence of images which ‘bore on 
the situation but that it was better not to touch, pass[ing] in silence between them’ (James 
1903: 151). 
 
Coulson (2004) asserts that the phenomenology of James’s late texts can be 
understood via Kristeva’s idea of the abject; and this theoretical framework is worth 
recapitulating.  Kristeva argues that ‘if the object…, through its opposition, settles me within 
the fragile texture of a desire for meaning, which…makes me ceaselessly and infinitely 
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homologous to it, what is abject, on the contrary, …is radically excluded and draws me 
toward the place where meaning collapses’ (1982: 1-2).  Kristeva’s ‘abjection’ is a state of 
limbo that blurs the dichotomy of subject and object, insisting on the original formlessness of 
both self and thing. In Coulson’s view, and as a result of abjection, subjectivity unfolds as a 
process and configuration of structuring in James’s novels.  I would argue that, definitions of 
subject and object are thus imbricated when, in The Wings of the Dove, Milly overhears an 
American woman and her two daughters evaluating some object of their gaze as 
‘handsome…in the English style’ (James 1902: 98) and turns to discover that object to be not 
a painting but Merton Densher, who is unaware of her presence.  She gazes at him until she 
discovers that Kate Croy is watching her watching, thereby transforming her into the object 
of surveillance.  For George Butte, this moment of crisis ‘mirrors exactly the paradigmatic 
moment of exposure and shame that for Sartre is always implicit in the gaze’ (2009: 135). To 
gaze is always to open oneself to the rupture of the other’s gaze: ‘Being seen by the Other is 
the truth of seeing-the-Other. . . . He is that object in the world that determines an internal 
haemorrhage"’ (Sartre 1940: 345, cited in Butte 2009). 
 
Moreover, though ‘the space of the abject’ can be relational between subjects and 
objects, it is excluded through ‘language as a common and universal law’ (Kristeva 1982: 
71).  I contend that it might therefore provide a definition for the pregnant abysses and voids 
in The Wings of the Dove which I delineated in the previous chapter as interpersonal spaces 
within which taboo subjects (Milly’s illness, Densher’s illicit relationship with Kate) are 
deposited, and drawn from in moments of crisis.  In this way the abject may provide an 
opening via which ‘telepathic’ connections in James’s novels may be explored.  This 
argument can be developed further by coordinating Kristeva’s emphases on the 
interchangeableness of subject and object, and the relational processes which facilitate this 
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configuration, with the conclusions of research into thought transference during the fin de 
siècle period.  The records of the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research from the 
period are highly populated with discussions of objects which exert power over human 
subjects.  For example, Mr R. Hodgson, writing in 1892, recounts how in his sittings with the 
medium Mrs. Piper, the aforementioned having gone into a trance, and being passed certain 
objects belonging to a Mrs Holmes – ‘a lock of hair cut close to the head’ and ‘a piece of 
ribbon she had worn around her neck’ could give detailed and intimate information about the 
personal relations of the owner, despite having not met her, on the basis that the inanimate 
things ‘had “influence”’ (1892: 140).  Other objects of occult influence in nineteenth century 
popular culture would include the hypnotically passing hands of the mesmerist, the evil eye, 
and the Ouija board.  In all these cases, telepathy dismantles control: it involves touch, even 
if it is at a distance, and even the most passive participation is active in a sense.  The 
relationship between subject and object in late James is therefore like that between the analyst 
and patient as Ferenczi (1932) describes it, whereby the analyst can read the patient’s 
unconscious thoughts, but the patient is also able to read the analyst’s – a process which, as 
Thurschwell (1999) details, Ferenczi aligned with telepathy.  As Hutchison (2004) notes, 
Strether’s ambivalent reaction to the spectacular array of art objects in the Paris gallery in 
The Ambassadors neatly matches Lacan’s reading of Holbein’s painting of the same name: 
paintings are not merely objects of our investigation; instead it is they who fix the viewer 
with their gaze, thereby holding the observer in thrall.  There is, therefore, a sense in which 
looking itself becomes a scrutinised object, requiring ‘a relay to the inter-subjective matrix to 
unfold its indexical gesture’ (Savoy 2001: 274), a relation which seems itself to echo the 
Society of Psychical Research’s ‘examination of the nature and extent of any influence which 
may be exerted by one mind upon another, apart from any generally recognised mode of 
perception’ (‘Objects of the Society’ 1883: 3). James’s protagonists and readers act as a 
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frame within which meanings are hazarded. As we try to discern them, they metamorphose 
into a series of imbricated, autonomous screens of insight and provenance.   
 
Observers in James’s novels, therefore, find themselves within a milieu in which 
perception is constantly in question.  In James’s late novels meaning is produced in 
collaboration with material objects – as Hopkins puts it, through a ‘progression from 
description to evocation and symbolization’ (1961: 566) – and for any protagonist who 
realises that he, like Strether, can perceive ‘thoughts… in the air’ (James 1903: 389), comes 
the fear that his own thoughts can be seen.  This configuration evokes Foucault’s delineation 
of modernity as a pervasive system of panoptical surveillance, which is penetrated through 
and through with the voyeuristic joy of spectacle (1975).  It is such a psychosocial 
environment which makes a lateral link with the pragmatist philosophy of William James 
pertinent.  Indeed, it can be argued that his concept of ‘the selectivity of attention’ (James 
1890), whereby a conscious state of complete focus is quite easily transformed into its 
opposite, a disjunctive situation of extreme distraction becomes a site for James’s late novels’ 
experimentation with perception’s unstable state.  The critical currency of the idea was 
considerable during the late nineteenth century, as Crary attests to at length in his 
Suspensions of Perception (1999), and it can therefore be considered in tune with James’s 
novels.  In the field of visual art, Cezanne’s Pines and Rocks is shown to engage in a sort of 
rhythm, one that tacitly grapples with modernity’s promise of completeness, but repeatedly 
arrests the brutal realisation of attention’s dissolving perceptual syntheses, and Crary 
elucidates that such vacillations were intrinsic not only to the optical gratification created by 
the stereoscope and other visual toys, but also to the flux between subject positions involved 
in perceptual experience more generally.  The choices of attention and distraction are, 
according to Crary, ‘two enormous spaces of possibility, on one hand the opening up of new 
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experimental forms of life, of freedom and creation ... on the other the elaboration of 
countless procedures’ (1999: 358). 
 
It can thus be posited that selectivity of attention holds the key to Lambert Strether’s 
strange talent for making the transition from Woolett norms to Parisian mores, and then to his 
own highly individualised mode of interpreting his ever-complicating circumstances.  As 
Williams writes,  
 
‘One of the most engaging aspects of William James’s writing, from a phenomenological 
point of view, is his treatment of the relationship between consciousness and body…one can 
live within a number of different frames of reference, and each world retains its own reality, 
after its own fashion, while the subject is interested in it…Once his attention is withdrawn, 
the reality of ‘the world’ also lapses.’ 
(1993: 14-15) 
 
In such a way, adrift amongst a horde of powerful commodities, Strether possesses ‘the 
oddity of a double consciousness’, there being ‘detachment in his zeal and curiousity in his 
indifference’ (James 1903: 56); and it is his ability to move consciously between the contrary 
states of observation and being observed (and by implication, subject and object) that allows 
him to work through the psychological disturbances of Paris’s ‘fine free range of bliss and 
bale’ (James 1903: 483). 
 
Thus, as Armstrong puts it, in James’s fiction ‘perfect transcendence escapes us and 
opacity looms everywhere’ (1983: 135) in relations with the hyperactive object world.  
Representing objects thus becomes a problem as Jamesian protagonists struggle to depict 
36 
 
what emerge to be powerful agents in their heterogeneous universe.  This is moreover, a 
situation symptomatic of wider cultural anxiety in the nineteenth century: just as Strether 
admits to little Bilham ‘Oh I do see, at least; and more than you’d believe or I can express’ 
(James 1903: 215), so does Marx, in his famous chapter in Capital on commodity fetishism 
have to shift metaphors every few sentences to do justice to the commodity’s pervasiveness 
and malleability as a form of depiction.  Even here, as Richards notes:  
 
‘The very conditions of language function to invest commodities with many of the attributes 
of the human agents of history… Because language has an maddening way of transforming 
the description of objects into a high drama of human agency and intention, a study of the 
barest facts of commodity culture always turns out to be an exploration of a fantastic realm in 
which things think, act, speak, rise, fall, fly, evolve.’ 
(Richards 1991: 11) 
 
Richards further contends that by the mid to late nineteenth century, the ‘era of spectacle’ (in 
Debord’s sense) had begun.  Richards regards the World’s Fairs of this period, in particular 
the Great Exhibition of 1851 as ‘semiotic laboratories for the labour theory of value’, and 
symbols of how ‘the capitalist system had not only created a dominant form of exchange, but 
was also in the process of creating a dominant form of representation to go along with it’ 
(1991: 3). 
 
I believe this formulation can be traced in the way that the object elides subject in 
James’s late novels.  The Crystal Palace in which the Great Exhibition was housed is 
described by Richards as ‘a museum and a market’ (1991: 19); and subsequent World’s Fairs 
replicated this archetype which brought ‘together a host of rare and exclusive things and 
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promising, in a way that is very hard to pin down, that each and every one of them would one 
day be democratically available to anyone and everyone’ (1991: 19).  It can be posited that 
they posit their own kind of distant intimacy, of the kind which Stewart outlines in her 
delineation of the function of the souvenir: ‘The double function of the souvenir is to 
authenticate a remote experience and, at the same time, to discredit the present.  The present 
is either too impersonal, too looming, or too alienating compared to the intimate and direct 
experience of contact which the souvenir has as its referent.  This referent is authenticity’ 
(1993: 139).  To put this another way, the cult of the collectible object generates the discourse 
of the occulted object via an escalation of value: the rarer the object, the more distant its 
openness, the more effulgent its allure and the more substantial its pledge for subjective 
gratification.  We are thus reminded of the thrall and mastery in which objects such as the 
Lambinet painting in The Ambassadors, the Bronzino portrait in The Wings of the Dove and 
the eponymous Golden Bowl hold James’s protagonists: the World’s Fair provides a cultural 
archetype pertaining to the way in which these objects manipulate the distance between the 
present and an imagined, prelapsarian experience, experience as it might be directly lived. 
  
Moreover, amongst such events, I would argue that he Exposition Universelle of 1900 
held in Paris, is of particular pertinence, not only due to its rough chronological concurrence 
with the publication dates of James’s later novels, and geographical agreement with the 
setting of The Ambassadors, but to its evocation of specific epistemological values: it 
provides a kind of blueprint for James’s characters’ psychoanalytic attachment to objects.  As 
Eric Savoy asserts, the phenomenology of James’s late texts is such that ‘the ontology of 
objects, the “thingness” of things, is profoundly recessive in discursive apprehension; 
moreover, it is precisely the impossibility of the thing (or the Thing) that redirects attention to 
the subjective emergence in the field of the thing and thus participates in the quasi-religious 
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pursuit of transcendent value’ (2001: 271).  In the light of this evaluation, it is possible to see 
in Strether’s vision of Paris as ‘a jewel brilliant and hard, in which parts were not to be 
discriminated nor differences comfortably marked…and what seemed all surface one moment 
seemed all depth the next’ (James 1903: 118) a visual double of the view of the Grand Palais 
– the large glass exhibition hall that was built for the Paris Exhibition – as seen from a 
distance.  As Woolacott contended in his article for the Harmondsworth Monthly Pictorial 
Magazine, ‘these iron-and-glass palaces have an ephemeral charm, and fill us with a child’s 
sense of amusement and festivity.  They will fade almost as soon as flowers; they are as 
brittle as the toys on a Christmas tree’ (1900: 51).  The building reflected its environs, and 
unless you were in close proximity, you could not see the multitude of commodities it 
enclosed.  Richards notes that the opacity of the Crystal Palace also did more than conceal its 
commodities, placing them ‘in a kind of casing that duplicated on a grand scale the little 
cases and slipcovers that affluent Victorians used to protect speciality items like pocket 
watches, thermometers, cutlery, and umbrellas’ (1991: 23), and this analogy will stand for the 
Grand Palais too.  Viewed from the outside, the Grand Palais was both an objet d’art and a 
reliquary, conferring sentimental worth on the things it enclosed and preserving them 
indefinitely in a gargantuan glass case.  But glass’s efficacy to display back the subject’s own 
reflection tacitly posits the potentiality for the observer to become an object as well.   
 
Contemplation of the souvenir therefore rapidly collapses in the face of what Susan 
Stewart calls the ‘logic of the gigantic’ (1993: 70), our most fundamental relation to which is 
articulated in our relation to landscape, our lived relation to the object-world as it surrounds 
us.  Her positioning of the body within the object-world is of particular pertinence to my 
discussion: we are enveloped by the gigantic, enclosed within its shadow.  Whereas we know 
smaller commodities as a spatial whole or as temporal parts, we know the gigantic only 
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partially.  We move through it; it does not move through us.  Consequently, both the 
miniature and the gigantic are described through metaphors of containment – the miniature is 
contained, the gigantic as container.  The Exposition Universelle exercised such dominion 
over its visitors most dramatically via the Trans-Siberian Railway Panorama, a simulated 
train ride, using a moving panorama, which recreated the most interesting stages of a journey 
from Moscow to Beijing on the Trans-Siberian Railway.  The installation, as Bransford 
(1994) describes it, included three 70-foot-long luxury railway cars, complete with saloons, 
dining rooms, and bedrooms. The audience would sit in the railway cars, and view the 
panorama through the windows.  This gallery faced a stage-like area where the immediate 
reality of a railway journey whereby objects close at hand seem to pass by more rapidly than 
distant ones was simulated via an inventive contraption involving multiple layers of moving 
objects and scrolling paintings. The nearest objects were sand, rocks, and boulders attached to 
a horizontal belt that moved at a speed of 1000 feet per minute.  Behind was a low screen 
painted with shrubs and brush, which moved at 400 feet per minute.  Next was another screen 
with paintings of more distant scenery moved at 130 feet per minute. The final screen was 25 
feet tall and 350 feet long, and showed mountains, forests, and cities.  It moved at just 16 feet 
per minute.  The net result of the operation of these four layers was to produce a simulated 
perspective of great depth.  As Crary notes, such installations ‘removed…autonomy from the 
observer…Like the phenakistoscope or the zootrope, the diorama was a machine of wheels in 
motion, one in which the observer was a component’ (1992: 113).  Stewart contends that the 
category of the gigantic, which includes such dramatic renderings of the natural landscape, is 
properly extended to include the modern city (1993: 78), and we are thus reminded of 
Strether’s fear that any acceptance of the ‘magical object’ of Paris ‘might give one’s authority 
away’ (James 1903: 118). 
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Moreover, the autonomy of the objects in the Grand Palais was such that a close 
philosophical parallel with solipsism suggests itself: the Edinburgh Review’s anonymous 
contributor writes of the collection of paintings inside as so unsympathetic to each other that 
amidst ‘the chaos of painted canvases…old friends and new, clamouring for attention’, ‘one 
sought in vain at least some guiding thread through the Daedelian labyrinth’ (‘Pictures at the 
Paris Exhibition’ 1900: 182).  The objects on show were so multifarious that visitors were 
virtually forced to adopt the selectivity of attention which I have established as symptomatic 
of the perceptual experience in James’s late novels, with the abovementioned reviewer 
concluding that ‘it is beyond question that in a natural state of things a great show of pictures 
should be in the sum, and not in the parts only, pleasant to the eye.  This is not the case here.  
But it is easy to understand wherefore.  It is the vast and inexpressible mixture of styles that 
is at fault…’ (‘Pictures at the Paris Exhibition’ 1900: 187) as he struggles to come to terms 
with the concomitant relational phenomena of spectacle and surveillance. 
 
It can therefore be concluded that the relationship between subjects and objects in 
James’s late novels is not an opposition but an unheirarchical system which produces 
meaning in a co-optive manner as it is projected into a continuum of space between the two 
agents.  The invocation of telepathy and visual culture in my argument, along with the 
‘semiotic laboratory’ of the World’s Fair (Richards 1991: 3), allows this literary phenomenon 
to be viewed as contiguous with cultural tropes as voiced by a heterogeneous range of fin de 
siècle discourses. It can, moreover, be asserted that this rapport between subjects and objects 
is most compelling in the experience of reading itself.  As Friedrich Kittler (1992) has traced 
in detail, the discourse network of 1900 is bound up through and through with the 
materialities and corporealities of reading and writing. These investigations make mind 
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reading inseparable from the matter of reading generally, and as my next chapter will explore, 
they become particularly entwined in Henry James’s mode of address. 
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CHAPTER THREE: LOOKING BEYOND 
 
Just as the opposition between subject and object is destabilised by the interplay of 
surveillance and spectacle in James’s fiction, so are the differences between visual and verbal 
signification dissolved in the author’s mode of address.  Such epistemological explorations 
engage with a vast semantic cache:  as Martin Jay notes, ‘even a rapid glance at the language 
we commonly use will demonstrate the ubiquity of visual metaphors’ (1994: 1).  Enlighten, 
examine, foresee, imagine, outlook, point of view, and perspective are but a few specimens.  
Moreover, as Wartofsky has contended, ‘human vision is itself an artefact’ (1979: 272) – and 
visual metaphors therefore have a historical resonance.  In this chapter, I hope to explore how 
the language of James’s last three novels is permeated by a conception of vision which allows 
them to develop the theme of the efficacy of the image in working from within the 
arbitrariness and instability of language in an attempt to find meaning. 
  
This is particularly efficacious when what a character’s thoughts fuse with their visual 
impressions, prompting meditation on the role of the visual in knowledge, so that ‘to see’ is 
also ‘to understand’.  Such an equation is established through the textures of language in The 
Ambassadors.  For example, when Strether makes his trip to the country and reflects on his 
European career, ‘the village aspect’ affects him ‘as whiteness, crookedness and blueness set 
in coppery green; there being positively, for that matter, an outer wall of the White Horse that 
was painted the most improbable shade’ (James 1902: 254). Mme. de Vionnet’s parasol 
makes ‘a pink point in the shining scene’ (James 1902: 257).  As Hopkins notes, the primary 
emphasis in the description of the village where he stops for dinner is ‘not on the thing 
modified by the adjective; instead, adjectives are converted into substantives’ (1961: 569), a 
grammatical move which places the accent on the sensory aspect of the visual experience as 
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opposed to on the thing itself.  Williams (1993) also notes the particular emphasis on what 
Strether sees in this passage: the ambassador is very much concerned with establishing how 
phenomena are to be grasped and interpreted; and the critic links this with the nascent 
philosophical method of existential phenomenology, as formulated by Husserl and 
recapitulated by Merleau-Ponty.   
 
Williams’s approach is complementary to my own: the critic places high importance 
on the illuminating effect ‘epoché’ (defined by Husserl (1931) as the process of bracketing all 
accustomed attitudes and reactions so that the world may appear as pure phenomenon) can 
have on a reading of James’s novels, and this meshes with my investigation into the ways in 
which James’s characters’ struggles to articulate their experience highlights the arbitrariness 
of categories of signification.  However, Merleau-Ponty also claims in ‘Eye and Mind’ that 
‘to see is to have at a distance; the artist gives visible existence to what is normally believed 
to be invisible, so that the eye lives in textures as a man lives in his house’ (1961: 166); and 
this makes me think not only of the historicised version of vision Crary describes in 
Techniques of the Observer (1992) and Suspensions of Perception (1999) as both collapsing 
and reinforcing space, but of telepathy, which constitutes ‘an oxymoronic distant (tele-) 
intimacy or touch (pathos)’ (Luckhurst 2002: 1).  There is an analogous relation between 
vision and affect in James’s late novels, which sees sensory perception become contiguous 
with extrasensory forms.  For example, in The Golden Bowl, in the scene in which Maggie 
and Adam Verver watch each other across the intervening space of the gallery at Fawns, as 
Charlotte lectures to her guests, silent communication is uninterrupted (‘“Poor thing, poor 
thing” – it reached straight – “isn’t she, for one’s credit, on the swagger”’ (James 1904: 527)) 
until Adam ‘turns short away’ (James 1904: 527) severing the ocular commerce between 
them, and simultaneously the intersubjective union.  Cameron concludes in her commentary 
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on The Wings of the Dove that ‘Regent’s Park becomes the site of thinking.  To be in the park 
is to see the externalisation.  For thought is not like a mental activity.  It is rather associated 
with benches and sheep’ (1989: 145).  Such textual examples illustrate the extent to which the 
visual stands in for the verbal to formulate meaning in James novels by showing that ‘inner’ 
thoughts can be externalised and perceived visually by others5. 
 
Moreover, I would contend that by coalescing the verbal and visual, James’s novels 
fulfil Foucault’s assertion in The Order of Things, that ‘between words and objects one can 
create new relations and specify characteristics of language and objects generally ignored in 
everyday life’ (1966: 294).  As such they have a deep cultural resonance with the intermedial 
negotiations in contemporary periodicals with which James’s original readership would have 
been familiar.  The Yellow Book, for example, juxtaposed avant-garde literature with 
provocative illustrations to create a mounting edifice testament to its status as the apotheosis 
of the new in fin de siècle culture.  However, as Fletcher asserts, Beardsley, the publication’s 
art editor ‘mostly widened the gap between text and illustration, and had little interest in the 
total book’ (1979: 194).  The mien which I trace in James’s work, however, has more in 
common with ‘the Mallarméan suite of blank pages, infinitely interpretable, in the 
notoriously empty second issue of the Equinox’ (Fletcher 1979: 191): insofar as it emphasises 
the material quality of words. 
                                                 
5 By showing the externalisation of ‘inner’ thoughts, these examples from James’s novels also show themselves 
to be in tune with the Society for Psychical Research’s investigations into crystal-gazing, which explored the 
confluence between visual perception and telepathy.  Indeed, as Lang contends, writing again about Miss 
Angus’s crystal gazing: 
 
‘…the stretching of the telepathic hypothesis was almost forced on me during her experiments with a glass 
ball…Again and again Miss Angus, sitting with man or woman, described acquaintances of theirs, but not of 
hers, in situations not known to the sitters, but proved to be true to fact….the crystal pictures appeared to be 
directed by the mind of a person present, not always the sitter.  Nothing remained for the speculative theoriser 
but the idea of cross currents of telepathy, between Miss Angus, a casual stranger, the sitters, and people far 
away, known to the sitters or the stranger, but unknown to Miss Angus.’ 
(Lang 1900, 48-49) 
 
45 
 
 
Foucault asserts in The Order of Things that for language to become an ‘object of 
knowledge among others’ it must render once more ‘noisy and audible the element of silence 
that all discourse carries with it as it is spoken’, so that the words become ‘isolated, tactile’ 
(1966: 301).  This dynamic is in evidence in The Golden Bowl: in Maggie’s last private 
meeting with her father at Fawns, where strategically placed silences give speech and thought 
their utmost scope, as they explore the nature of their familial bond.  Williams’s analysis of 
this passage is notable for its emphasis on the materiality of words: ‘language is “folded 
over” upon silence, and silence upon language; speech wells up out of the diversity of 
experience, and flows back to reshape and redirect that experience’ (1993: 207).  Thus, James 
perceptively shows how the act of conversing allows language to be turned over and 
examined in the hands of its speakers, generating a fresh range of meanings.  This mode of 
address, as encountered by the reader, together with James’s own circuitous, nuanced 
narration fulfils Foucault’s expectation of language as object: ‘a silent, cautious deposition of 
the word upon the whiteness of a piece of paper, where it can possess neither sound nor 
interlocutor, where it has nothing to say but itself, nothing to do but shine in the brightness of 
being’ (1966: 300). 
 
It follows that the opposite of this process can occur: that the object can become a 
text.  Barthes states that everything from painting to objects, to practices, and to people, can 
be studied as a text (1980); and illuminated by this formula, we can see James’s novels as 
participating in this discourse on semiotics.  It is evidenced in the phenomenological 
existence of the characters.  For example, in The Wings of the Dove, Densher senses that Mrs. 
Lowder represents the overwhelming power which makes Kate exploit Millie. He reads it in 
‘the huge, heavy objects that syllabled his hostess’ story’ (James 1902: 73). It is ‘the 
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language of the house itself that spoke to him, writing out for him, with surpassing breadth 
and freedom, the associations and conceptions, the ideals and possibilities of the 
mistress’(James 1902: 74).  Moreover, on contemplation of the Lambinet painting which 
Strether imagines entering in The Ambassadors, ‘not a single one of his observations but 
somehow fell into a place in it; not a breath of the cooler evening that wasn't somehow a 
syllable of the text’ (James 1903: 458), thus tacitly positing the view, as Mitchell does, that 
‘there is no essential difference between poetry and painting, no difference, that is, that is 
given for all time by the inherent natures of the media, the objects they represent, or the laws 
of the human mind’ (Mitchell 1994: 160-1).   
 
However, this confluence of semiotic categories in James does not necessarily mean 
submitting to what Bann refers to as ‘the risky presumption that the visual work of art can be 
translated into the terms of verbal discourse without remainder’ (1989: 28).  There is room in 
the semiotics of James’s novels for the conviction that a good proportion of the visual 
experience which cannot be expressed in verbal terms, and vice versa.  Strether’s assertion 
that ‘Oh I do see, at least; and more than you’d believe or I can express’ (James 1903: 215), 
which I cited in the chapter previous to this, is a development of his earlier declaration in 
conversation with Miss Barrace and Bilham that ‘You’ve all of you so much visual sense that 
you’ve somehow all “run” to it.  There are moments when it strikes one that you haven’t any 
other’ (James 1903: 207).  Moreover, it can be argued that the dualism James’s late novels 
portray is not between visual and verbal varieties of perception, but between sign and 
signified.  As Wagner asserts, ‘ekphrasis has a Janus face’ (1996: 13): as a form of mimesis, 
it stages a paradoxical performance, promising to give voice to the allegedly silent image 
even while attempting to overcome the power of the image by transforming and inscribing it.  
As Stevens notes in reference to The Wings of the Dove, ‘James insistence on “an adopted, a 
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related point of view”, the filtering of events through a “recording consciousness”, entails a 
recognition of the distance between signification and signified, the difficulty of getting to the 
“signified” beyond the particular modes of signification used’ (1998: 22).  In this way, James 
sustains the tension between experience itself, and his characters’ flourishes of creative 
elaboration, and meaning is postponed through an endless chain of signifiers. 
 
This constant deferral of meaning suggests a mode of reading which can be labelled 
‘symptomatic’, after Althusser’s definition.  In Reading Capital (1965), the author 
emphasises the ‘opacity of the immediate’ and the difference which it implies between the 
‘imaginary’ (derived from Lacan, and denoting a pledged completeness) and the true.  
According to this model, the gulf is bridged by the reader attending to the absences, gaps, and 
declensions of a text.  In terms of reading James’s late novels, this implies craving the 
abysses courted by their protagonists in search of meaning.  The reader is thus faced with the 
complex task of tracing out the interweaving patterns of ambiguity, and of following through 
the machinations by which the text overlays stratum upon stratum of interlocking 
significations.  Such demands are made of readers of any novel; yet as Williams (1993) notes, 
James’s later fiction represents a special problem, because it relies so heavily upon the 
creative interpretation of what Iser calls ‘spots of indeterminacy’, ‘the unwritten part’ of the 
text ‘that gives us the opportunity to picture things; indeed without the elements of 
indeterminacy, the gaps in the text, we should not be able to use our imagination’ (Iser 1974: 
11, cited in Williams 1993).   
 
Moreover, it can be argued that because James’s novels anticipate our conclusions in 
this way, this way of reading constitutes a kind of thought transference which, in the 
historical moment in which the novels were written, would be delineated as ‘telepathy’. 
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Royle asserts that telepathy may appear ‘as some uncanny reading-machine, a sort of reader-
response criticism in reverse’ (1991: 7), anticipating our conclusions before we reach them; 
and the interpretation of the process of reading James’s novels posited above shows that this 
formulation can work in reverse.  As has been discussed, in James’s late novels, meaning is 
ciphered through the subjective faculties of the protagonists, which in turn is filtered through 
a circuitous mode of address which elides the boundaries between visual and verbal signifiers 
only achieving its measure of plenitude once the contributing aspects begin to coalesce with 
one another.  Things are always ‘seeming’ and ‘appearing’ and ‘as if’, and Wood has listed a 
host of words and phrases of discovery in James’s later work: ‘see that’, ‘see how’, ‘make 
out’, ‘recognise’, and of course ‘learn’ and ‘know’ (2005: 15).  We may experience the slow 
revelation of knowledge in the process of reading, as Wood suggests, ‘ideas have their 
present and past life in written words, that in being read they become what they are, which is 
already a paradox, like slouching towards Bethlehem to be born, and also become what they 
have been’ (2005: 10). 
 
James’s novels seem to call forth our unformed thoughts, lending force to Myer’s 
argument that the faculty for telepathy is located in the unconscious (1903), a hidden stratum 
comprised thoughts and feelings that seldom emerged into the field of attention, habitually 
identified with the self, so that thought transference is a process of articulating one’s own 
feelings, not only those of which the mind reader is aware, but also those thoughts and 
feelings beyond the margins of his or her consciousness.  They can therefore be used to help 
advance the thesis that psychical phenomena are fundamentally textual.  This concept has a 
persistent cross-cultural currency in the fin de siècle, with its nexus in the critical process 
behind Myers’ formulation of coining of ‘telepathy’.  As Brocklebank (2005) also notes, it is 
in theorizing what it means to read that Myers first articulated the concept of telepathy: in a 
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lecture addressed to the ‘general reader’ and given at the request of the Dublin Afternoon 
Lectures Committee, he declared: ‘the best way to read other people’s minds,—which we 
know very little about,—is not to set to work imagining what they are likely to feel, but to tell 
them what one feels oneself’ (1868: 5, cited in Brocklebank 2005).  Myers titled his speech 
‘Books to Read: A Lecture’, subsequently printing it privately under the same title, and his 
assertion of a link between reading and psychic force exemplifies the kind of comments that 
he put forth in articles for the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, as well as 
those made by contemporary treatises on reading, such as the anonymous reviewer cited by 
Brocklebank, who explains that the sympathetic force of a novel such as Villette would 
‘operate upon’ the reader by causing ‘the deepest and saddest secrets of his own being’ to 
emerge (Brocklebank 2005: 234).  The theory of telepathy is therefore inextricably linked to 
the question of reading, and this formulation is borne out by the circuitous mode of address 
James employs in his novels.  The coordination of these concepts, moreover, echoes the 
mechanics of intersubjectivity between characters in the texts: for example, in The Wings of 
the Dove Densher relates knowing with reading, pronouncing Kate ‘a whole library of the 
unknown, the uncut’ (James 1902: 151). 
 
Moreover, Myers emphasises that the ‘readable’ telepathic messages of texts are 
‘addressed’ to their specific recipients (1868: 15, cited in Brocklebank 2005), asserting an 
occult intimacy across space and time, and their interconnectedness with emergent and 
established forms of written communication can therefore be elucidated.6  As Derrida argues, 
telepathy is governed by a logic of ‘destinerrance’.  He writes that ‘The ultimate naivety 
would be to allow oneself to think that Telepathy guarantees a destination which posts and 
telecommunications fail to provide’ (1988: 110).  Appropriately, telepathic communications 
                                                 
6 Thurschwell engages thoroughly with this relation in the third chapter of her monograph, Literature, 
Technology and Magical Thinking, 1880-1992, with particular emphasis on the typewriter and telegraph and 
their bearing on intersubjectivity in Henry James’s In the Cage. 
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in The Wings of the Dove are doubled by the telegram which beats Densher to his destination, 
and the letter from Milly to Densher, which is burnt, unopened, as he and Kate ‘recognised it, 
knew what it was, without touching it’ (James 1902: 441).   
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that, as I will explore in greater depth in my conclusion, 
a telepathic relationship can be said to exist between texts.  For example, Kate Croy’s 
attestation to Densher in The Wings of the Dove that ‘I exist in you’ (James 1902: 261) 
simultaneously exists in Svengali’s phrenic co-presence with the eponymous heroine of the 
contemporary popular novel, Trilby (1894), and W. T. Stead’s contention in Real Ghost 
Stories that ‘each of us has a ghost inside him’ (Stead 1897: 16).  Just as the reader enters a 
‘telepathic’ relationship with James’s late novels by coalescing their various and complex 
aspects to fill the ‘gaps in the text’, so the literary critic or cultural analyst may draw on a 
relatively small number of literary texts or other cultural exempla to suggest the wider scope 
of systems of thought at a certain point in history.  This insight returns us to Althusser, and 
Reading Capital, where he asserts that the ‘oversights’ of ‘symptomatic reading’ (1965: 20), 
these intriguing blanks in the crowded text are not only dissociated from conscious authorial 
intention, but need ‘an informed gaze, a new gaze…produced by a reflection of the “change 
of terrain” on the exercise of vision’ (1965: 25) to identify them. 
 
Thus, separated from the publication of James’s novels and their cultural milieu by a 
century, it is now possible to view their characteristic inconclusiveness as a dramatic echoing 
of inconclusiveness in the wider scope of modernity, and particularly in the context of 
contemporary visual art.  Specifically, they evoke the contours of late nineteenth century 
debate over the hermeneutic value of Impressionism, which Jay (1994) refers to as the 
beginning of the ‘antiocularcentric discourse’ in Western thought.  This cultural configuration 
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can be most persistently observed in The Ambassadors, in the scene referred to at the 
beginning of this chapter, where Strether retreats to the French countryside to meditate on the 
events of his European excursion thus far.  ‘The valley on the further side was all copper-
green level and glazed pearly sky, a sky hatched across with screens of trimmed trees, which 
looked flat, like espaliers’ (James 1903: 459). The scene is, as Hopkins also notes, 
unmistakeably of the impressionist mien: ‘Colour details are rendered with greater 
precision…Distant objects are not described as if the perspective were conventional’ (1961, 
569).  Moreover, the discovery of Strether’s with which this episode climaxes, that ‘he was 
mixed up with the typical tale of Paris’  (James 1903: 472) is analogous with the 
impressionist privileging of the transcendental truth of ‘a world, the phenomena of which are 
in a state of constant flux and transition, produces the impression of a continuum in which 
everything coalesces, and in which there are no differences but the various approaches and 
point of view of the beholder’ (Jay 1994: 174). 
 
However, The Ambassadors as a whole suggests a more complicated ontology.  The 
novel achieves its measure of plenitude once the contributing aspects of Strether’s adventure 
begin to confirm, complement and perfect one another.  Nonetheless, the story is complete, 
but unfinished, as the fates of the characters remain in doubt.  As Righter asserts, ‘the 
absence of emotional fulfilment is a precise area of Jamesian knowledge’, and Milly’s fate in 
The Wings of the Dove is tragic because of its ‘deep and terrifying emptiness’ (Righter 2004: 
160); because ‘it is not the result of things that happen to her but of things that don’t’ (Righter 
2004: 161).  The novel may therefore be said to receive a corrective impulse from the post-
impressionist reaction to impressionism characterised by Gauguin’s dismissal of the latter 
movement (‘they heed only the eye and neglect the mysterious centre of thought’ (Jay 1994: 
180)), with the novel in its totality perhaps closer to approximating Seurat’s method.  Just as 
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A Sunday Afternoon on the Island of La Grand Jatte uses tiny juxtaposed dots of multi-
coloured paint to allow the viewer’s eye to blend colours optically, rather than having the 
colours blended on the canvas or pre-blended as a pigment, James gives away none of his 
conclusions, and the reader is obliged to work very hard to judge ‘the whole piece by the 
pattern’ (James 1903: 45), though a contrived unity can be achieved by ‘viewing’ the piece 
from a hermeneutic distance.  A further analogy could be drawn on this basis between 
James’s mode of address and the development of halftone printing.  The reprographic 
technique simulates smooth tone imagery through the use of dots, differing either in size or in 
spacing, which are merged into continuous tones by the human eye.   It was, moreover, 
prevalent in the multifarious literary culture which my study insists James’s novels 
participate in: as Twyman (1970) asserts, the use of halftone blocks in popular journals 
became regular during the early 1890s. 
 
Moreover, we might find in Seurat’s scientific approach to the emotional and 
symbolic qualities of line and colour an attitude suggestive of the occulted facility for objects 
in James’s late novels to speak as texts identified earlier in this chapter. According to William 
Innes Homer (1964), influences on Seurat included the mathematician Charles Henry who in 
the 1880s delivered monologues at the Sorbonne about the emotional properties and symbolic 
meaning of lines and colour.  Seurat’s letter to Maurice Beaubourg in 1890 captures his 
feelings about the scientific approach to emotion and harmony. Seurat states ‘Art is 
Harmony. Harmony is the analogy of the contrary and of similar elements of tone, of colour 
and of line, considered according to their dominance and under the influence of light, in gay, 
calm or sad combinations’ (1890: 113). 
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The inconclusiveness of James’s novels therefore illuminates a wider 
inconclusiveness in fin de siècle culture.  In the process of disclosing a fresh perspective on 
the world which, as my first and second chapters have delineated, is fragmented into multiple 
perspectives, James forces the reader to enter telepathically into the impressions of another, 
encountering a tangle of emerging images, halfway between verbal and visual signifiers, 
which through their engagement with nascent representational tropes in fin de siècle culture, 
substantiate Wartofsky’s assertion of the testimonial value of vision, that it ‘is itself an 
artefact’ (1979: 272). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
I began this thesis by invoking Henry James’s assessment of Agnes and Julius 
Zancig’s late nineteenth century stage act involving thought transference, in which the 
novelist dismisses claims of fraud against the pair, and acknowledges the possibility of 
telepathy, insofar as it can be co-ordinated with the mysteries of vision and the theory of a 
‘hidden code’ (James 1907: 197).  Against the critical backdrop of research such as 
Luckhurst’s, which asserts the subtle ways in which the obsession in James’s late fiction with 
relation itself (2002: 234) can be seen to engage with such fin de siècle encounters with 
telepathy, I asserted the importance of the visual, as a third term, to fully excavate the cultural 
work which James’s novels are involved in.  In my last chapter, this culminated in the 
delineation of the strange codes compassed by James’s novels via the reading process itself: 
via their constant deferral of authority between verbal and visual signifiers, they emulate the 
ability of the nascent visual tropes of post-impressionist art and halftone printing to engage us 
in a kind of telepathy, where we ‘complete the incomplete’, deriving meaning from absences 
and declensions.  This final conclusion is anticipated by the illations of the preceding 
chapters: in my second chapter, the abolished philosophical opposition between subject and 
object as master and slave in James’ texts makes way for a nonlinear system of rapport which 
in turn provides the foundation for the exploration of the aforementioned relation between the 
reader and novels themselves; and the coordination of the processes of observation and 
imagination delineated in my first chapter, provides the foundation for an understanding of 
the strange process of negotiating the peculiar admixture of presences and absences in 
James’s late novels. 
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However, if texts can be telepathic, is there not a sense in which they can read each 
other?  If, as Derrida asserts, ‘each text is a machine with multiple reading heads for other 
texts’ (1979: 107), what do The Wings of the Dove, The Ambassadors, and The Golden Bowl 
read with their mechanical promontories?  In the last chapter I asserted that the 
intersubjective relation between Kate and Densher is contiguous with thought-transference in 
Trilby and Real Ghost Stories; and because of the historical moment in which they appeared, 
all three instances might be delineated as examples of telepathy.  But, granting literature the 
requisite agency to perceive and ‘read’, we are reminded that according to the Bergsonian 
formulation which my first chapter engages with, recollection is created alongside perception 
(Bergson 1908), and as such a range of textual memories may be said to be immanent behind 
the portrayals of intersubjectivity in James’s texts.  If, in addition, one considers the 
contention by Royle that ‘the history of the term “telepathy” is intimately related to that of 
the concept of sympathy’, a relation which can be traced ‘through the work of David Hume 
and Adam Smith or, in poetry, through Wordsworth and Coleridge’ (1991: 4), the potential 
for further research, beyond the borders of this thesis, is revealed in terms of locating the 
‘telepathic’ exchanges in James’s late novels within a literary genealogy of affect. 
 
Let us imagine what the parameters of such a study might be.  Sympathy is defined in 
Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments as that which denotes ‘our fellow-feeling with any 
passion whatsoever’ (1759: 13).  Its efficacy for a study of predominantly textual phenomena 
is affirmed by the way Smith expands on its definition in the Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles 
Lettres.  Here, Smith deals explicitly with the power that the writer has to produce a wide 
range of sympathetic responses in the reader: ‘We enter into their [sc. Human beings’] 
misfortunes, grieve when they grieve, rejoice when they rejoice, and in a word feel for them 
in some respect as if we ourselves were in the same condition’ (1764: 90).  Royle asserts: 
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‘…the emergence of Romanticism in the second half of the eighteenth and through the early 
nineteenth century, was directly linked to an intensified, even unprecedented preoccupation 
with notions of sympathy; and that in some ways the historical appearance of ‘telepathy’ 
could be viewed as the inevitable outcome, or hyperbolisation, of the importance of 
‘sympathy’ in Romanticism.’ 
(1991: 4-5) 
  The embryonic project sketched here would give deference to this critical perspective: the 
similitude is to be acknowledged between the resonance of Smith’s definition of sympathy 
with the democratisation of the poetic form by Wordsworth and Coleridge insofar as their 
emphasis on the vitality of the living voice that the poor use in Lyrical Ballads helps point 
out the universality of human emotions, and the ease with which James’s texts’ tacit 
invitation to complete the incomplete is accommodated to discourse on telepathy at the end of 
the nineteenth century. 
 
There is moreover, a limited sense in which sympathy is predicated on a relationship 
with the visual; and future research into this eighteenth century trope might therefore 
reasonably build upon the triangulated relationship between telepathy, the visual, and Henry 
James’s late novels in my current thesis.  As Broadie (2006) notes, for Smith, sympathy 
cannot be detached from spectatorship, for it is spectators who sympathise.  According to the 
doctrine of sympathy as developed in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, sympathy is 
consequent on a spectator’s cognition of a person’s feelings or emotions.  But it is to be noted 
that when describing sympathy’s most extreme intersubjective leaps, Smith (1759) recourses 
to aural metaphors such as ‘dissonance’ (14), ‘concord’, and ‘harmony’ (23). With this in 
mind, I believe it would not be efficacious to pursue the literary and cultural antecedents of 
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Jamesian intersubjectivity with the same emphasis on the visual as sustained in my current 
thesis.  Instead, it might be contended that the complexities of sympathy are best compassed 
by showing how the concept engages with purely aural modes of expression such as music.  
As Foucault asserts in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969), a discursive formation 
continually generates new statements, and some of these usher in changes in the discursive 
formation that may not be adopted.  Therefore, to describe a discursive formation, one must 
focus on expelled and forgotten discourses, as their differences to the dominant discourse also 
describe it.  This configuration would properly contextualised by recent research into the 
eighteenth century discourse on semiotics, semantic tropes in contemporary poetry, and, 
indeed, the earliest of nineteenth century experiments with telepathy. 
 
Whilst my current thesis is able to conclude by drawing attention to the characteristic 
indeterminacy of James’s late style as a dramatic echoing of inconclusiveness in the wider 
scope of contemporary visual culture, especially in the context of post impressionist art, 
which engages the viewer in a kind of telepathy, encouraging him, like the reader of James’s 
texts, to ‘complete the incomplete’, such a configuration is not available to a discussion of the 
cultural determinants of sympathy in the eighteenth century.  As Barry contends, ‘during the 
eighteenth century…painting stands as the type of the “full” sign, and holds first place in any 
theory of representation’ (1987: 2).  Hipple (1954) explores the ways in which painters and 
poets entered into a complex agreement in their ‘imitations’ of the sublime, of the beautiful, 
of the picturesque, and of the natural and social landscape, tacitly appropriating John Locke’s 
‘doctrine of signs’ (1690).  Locke argues that signs are marks which stand for things: that is, 
‘their proper and immediate signification’ (1690: 290).  These are not the ‘abysses’ to touch 
at a distance with those in The Wings of the Dove.  But, as Barry has contended,  
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‘…little attention has been given to the ways in which eighteenth-century thinking also 
includes another interaction: that between a concept of language and a concept of the 
“empty” sign.  Such an interaction presupposes ideas about the inadequacies of 
representation.  It looks to music, rather than painting, in order to describe an alternative and 
conflicting model of interpretation and of value’  
(1987: 11) 
 
Barry goes on to elucidate that given that a piece of instrumental music must seem, 
according to Lockean principles, to be void of signification, the gratification it supplies is 
proof of the need for an aesthetic subtle and intricate enough to include ‘the pleasures of 
uncertainty in interpretation and of some free subjectivity in response’ (1987: 21).  The 
analogy with music is used here to classify and to express the association between signs and 
their reception, between words and reading.  I would suggest that the response of the listener 
to the ‘empty’ signs of music may therefore become a model of the response of the reader to 
the text recalling the emphasis by Iser on the creative interpretation of ‘spots of 
indeterminacy’ (Iser 1974) in the work of art as recapitulated earlier in my third chapter with 
specific reference to James’s gnomic mode of address. 
 
It would be argued that Romantic literature is particularly receptive to this 
configuration due to its peculiar tenor and mode. Criticism appears to buttress this 
perspective: Minahan (1992) and Donelan (2008) also contend that a persistent figure exists 
in Romantic poetry which posits language as a kind of music, the emptiness of which 
contributes to its intensity.  This trope can be observed in Book V of Wordsworth’s ‘The 
Prelude’, where the mysterious sound of a shell is ascribed visionary power so that the 
speaker hears ‘…an unknown tongue, / Which yet I understood, articulate sounds, / A loud 
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prophetic blast of harmony’ (1850: 175, cited in Royle 1991).  Elsewhere, the enigmatic 
music of the Abyssinian Maid in Coleridge’s ‘Kubla Khan’ becomes the site of ekphrasis, 
imaginatively recreating in air the Khan’s ‘sunny dome’ and ‘caves of ice’ through a kind of 
synaesthesia so that ‘all who heard should see them there’ (1816: 103).   
 
Thus establishing sympathy as a purely aural phenomenon, it would be investigated 
how far telepathy might also be defined as such.  It would be posited that Smith’s insistence 
on the terms ‘dissonance’ and ‘concord’ to show the varying degrees of sympathy, echoes the 
vocabulary used in the nineteenth century to explain thought-reading.  In 1882, William 
Barrett explained:  
 
‘…the brain might be regarded as the seat of radiant energy like a glowing or sounding body.  
In this case, the reception of this energy would depend upon a possibility  of synchronous 
vibration in the absorbing body; which, moreover, may be constituted like a sensitive flame 
in a state of unstable equilibrium, so that a distant mental disturbance might suddenly and 
profoundly agitate particular minds, whilst others might remain quiescent.’ 
 
(1882: 62, cited in Luckhurst 2002). 
 
 Oliver Lodge, attempting to explain telepathy to a general readership in Forum magazine, 
pointed to the synchronous vibrations of tuning forks: ‘A couple of tuning forks, or precisely 
similar music instruments, isolated from each other and from other bodies, suspended in the 
air, let us say.  Sound one of them and the other responds – i.e. begins to emit the same note.  
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This is known in acoustics as sympathetic resonance’ (1909: 56, cited in Luckhurst 2002)7.  
Building upon these collocations between sympathy and telepathy, my prospective study 
would attempt to compass what traces of ‘sympathetic resonance’ remain in Jamesian 
intersubjectivity, rising up from the texts’ unconscious, to encounter the present moment, 
performing the function of ‘true memory’ as Bergson (1908) defines it.  Academic work 
which identifies the common tendency of late nineteenth century opera and James’s novels 
towards indeterminacy (Jordan & Kafalenos 1989) would be marshalled as further critical 
context for this prospective work. 
 
Thus, by elucidating the parallelism between the labyrinthine narratologies of James’s 
late novels and contemporaneous musical compositions, the conclusions of my current thesis 
might be engaged with and extended, as the tripartite relation between telepathy, the visual, 
and the novels of Henry James is re-imagined as situated within a web of confederate 
discourses including sympathy, Romantic poetry and the musical sign. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Any discussion of ‘sympathetic resonance’ would necessarily also refer to John Tyndall’s lectures on sound 
(1867), which Luckhurst (2002) co-ordinates with theories of Barrett and Lodge in his analysis. 
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